Thursday, May 28, 2009

Discord is shrill; India wants mellow music - by MJ Akbar

In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India.

Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to.

Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes. My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found here.

Some of the articles analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.

Discord is shrill; India wants mellow music - by MJ Akbar

Has the BJP got trapped in the Bosnia joke: Nothing can succeed, not even a crisis? As the party thinks its way through the present impasse, it needs two things that politicians avoid since both come with uncomfortable demands: Clarity and honesty. Mr Arun Jaitley, the general secretary who played a significant part in shaping the campaign, summed it all up succinctly when he said, “Shrillness does not pay.” It would be too much to expect Mr Jaitley to dwell in public on the shrillness that characterised the rhetoric of too many disparate BJP candidates, the most notable of whom was of course the overblown Varun Gandhi, but one presumes that he has made the point in private confabulations that must be taking place in the BJP leadership.

No one, and particularly not anyone young, wants the shriek of conflict to disturb the peace of India. Throwing pebbles at any caste, community or gender is a vote-loser. India still loves a preacher, as the epidemic of religious channels on television would indicate, but it has no time for the bully. Independence is not an esoteric political fact, handed down to us by Gandhi and his remarkable generation. Independence is now the motif of individual life. Young people who go to bars do not interfere with those who might seek solace in the brotherhood of the Bajrang Dal. In return, they expect the Dal to leave them alone to their definition of pleasure. It is with great difficulty that Indians tolerate the police; reason forces them to do so even when their instinct tells them to ride around or beyond the law in the small matters of daily existence. Why on earth would they have any patience with a moral police in a free society?

It is perfectly possible to note trends of political behaviour in the changing patterns of Indian life. Urban middle class Indians throng towards malls; the poor aspire for them. The mall is now a community centre for the young. They see merit in order, availability, convenience and of course the air-conditioning. The corner shop is being replaced. The vendor will gradually be displaced. The old market, a collection of individual vendors, now represents haggling and uncertain quality. Regional parties are the vendors of the political marketplace, and the sound of their haggling, compounded with their uncertain quality, has begun to grate on the voter. He did not abandon the corner shop completely — neither has India — but he preferred the mall. Between the two principal centres available, he chose the tricolour variety in 2009.

The BJP can take comfort in the fact that it is also a mall, but in need of serious redecoration as well as a radical reorientation in its display of goods. In some basics there is no difference between the saffron and the tricolour malls. They share a common economic policy, which is after all the meat and bones of the political shop. There is not much difference in foreign policy either. The divergence comes in the culture of the environment. People want pilau and papad to coexist even if they are not available in the same restaurant. You cannot impose a vegetarian code on a public environment. Freedom means the right to choose, and you can choose only if there is choice.

A modern nation is much more than a collection of skyscrapers or fantasy cities shimmering in the middle of nowhere. It is an idea that permits the individual to live without fear. Sometimes (often?) this absence of fear can degenerate into licence. We need to go no further than the nearest urban street to see how an Indian can stretch freedom into chaos. I often feel that we need our new highways not for speed but simply for mobility, for they eliminate the Indian driver’s ability to overtake illegally, or cross lanes; the only real damage he can now do is to himself. But no Indian is going to exchange the confusions of intemperate behaviour for dictatorship. Governments have learnt to abjure dictatorship after the Emergency. Parties who feel that they can invoke fear, whether against women, or lower castes, or upper castes, or minorities have missed the social and cultural nuances of a changing India.

It is entirely symmetrical that Mr Manmohan Singh should be the first Prime Minister to be re-elected after Rajiv Gandhi gave the 18-year-old the vote. The young did not give the Congress all its 206 seats. And there were young voters who supported other parties as well. But I suspect that more detailed analysis will show that the young tipped perhaps 40 or 50 seats towards the Congress, turning a victory into a decisive victory. In this fact lies a serious danger for the Congress.

The young are wonderful when enamored; they turn deadly when disappointed. In 2004, India was a bit surprised by the sudden presence of a new Government. This time, it was the turn of the Opposition to be surprised by defeat. A deliberate vote for continuity has raised expectations to a point where non-delivery is going to extract a heavy penalty. The days of politics as usual are over. You cannot be blasé about a claim that only five or 10 paise per development rupee reaches the voter. You have to change this corrupt equation, because it is corruption, by the rich and middle class, that is denying the poor their rights. We talk glibly of the young. Our image of them is the one promoted in media, in tees and jeans. But this fringe of rich or middle class youth is vastly outnumbered by youth on subsistence levels, in slums and villages. The Maoist brigades are full of Indian young, and you cannot dismiss them as pernicious enemies or terrorists without asking what has driven them to the safety of a jungle and the anger of a gun. They were born in India, and are asking for the jobs that can bring them food, T-shirts and jeans.

A party’s crisis is nothing compared to a nation’s crisis, and vast stretches of India are in an unprecedented crisis. If the BJP wants to get out of its Bosnia trap then there is only one way out: The rhetoric of conflict must be replaced by the calm of consensus; and the promise of wealth creation has to be accompanied by radical wealth distribution. As Mr Jaitley has recognised, discord is shrill. India wants more mellow music.

Why Rahul charmed voters - by Swapan Dasgupta

In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India.

Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to.

Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes. My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found here.

Some of the articles analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.


Why Rahul charmed voters - by
Swapan Dasgupta

http://dailypioneer.com/178283/Why-Rahul-charmed-voters.html

In December 1984, Rajiv Gandhi secured by far the most categorical endorsement from the Indian voter. The landslide victory was described by many as the ‘sympathy wave’ that arose from Indira Gandhi’s assassination. However, chroniclers also noted that the grief over Indira’s death was accompanied by an expectation of change. Rajiv, it was clear even during the campaign, was different from the run-of-the-mill
khadi-wearing Congress leader. His idiom was markedly different, and even anti-political in many respects. As Arun Singh, his close associate with whom he fell out subsequently, put it evocatively, Rajiv symbolised the coming of age of the “Beatles generation”.

The more things change, the more they remain the same. Some 25 years after Rajiv’s famous victory, it is tempting to see parallels with the just concluded Lok Sabha poll. True, the mandate for the Congress is nowhere as categorical and the party’s candidate for the top job is far removed from all manifestations of youthfulness. Yet, it is undeniable that the crucial swing votes which enabled the Congress to win more than 200 seats on its own came from two sections that are in the frontline of change and modernity: The middle classes and the youth. The inference is that, as in 1984, the Congress received an endorsement both for the present and for the future.

Disaggregated surveys will reveal the magnitude of ‘modern’ India’s support for Congress but the instant conclusion is that Rahul Gandhi helped tilt the balance in favour of the incumbent. His energy and willingness to take risks complemented the note of reassurance provided by Manmohan Singh. These considerations will weigh heavily on the Congress when it charts its future course.

To reduce the appeal of Rajiv in his prime and Rahul in this election to merely a function of age would be unduly simplistic. The Congress didn’t field that many ‘young’ candidates this election. Most of its candidates were tried and tested political functionaries-in fact often the very ones who received a drubbing in the 1990s. In Delhi, where the party registered its most categorical victory, only two of its seven candidates corresponded to the so-called new look and both had tasted their first parliamentary victory in 2004. In Uttar Pradesh, where the party recorded a spectacular advance, its victorious candidates were mostly old political hands. There were about five exceptions.

This is not to suggest that the impact of Rahul in this election has been exaggerated. Rahul, it would seem, bolstered one of the main attributes of the Prime Minister: He enhanced the decency quotient of the Congress.

The association of decency with the Congress may seem quite galling for a generation that still remembers the Emergency, the high-handedness of Sanjay Gandhi, the brazen cover-up that was attempted during the Bofors controversy and the bribery of MPs that occurred during Narasimha Rao’s regime. To this may be added the wheeling-dealing that took place during the trust vote last July.

Why were these misdeeds of the Congress overlooked in the 2009 poll? One of the obvious answers is the moral equivalence drawn between the Congress and BJP. The BJP, which was once noted for its disciplined dedication, was perceived to be as much a problem as the old guard of the Congress. The Congress’ integrity quotient didn’t rise; the BJP's fell dramatically in the past decade.

If there was a dismal but level playing field between the Congress and the BJP on the integrity front, the Congress stole a march over its rival on the decency front. Manmohan came across as upright but politically somewhat innocent, and Rahul’s appeal was his energy and earnestness. This doesn’t imply that LK Advani was viewed as being disreputable. Advani commanded respect but it was a veneration that was befitting the family patriarch. The BJP’s “
majboot neta” campaign would have been spot on if voters saw the election as a presidential contest involving Manmohan and Advani. Unfortunately for the BJP, the people not only voted for their today but also their tomorrow. On the latter count, the BJP didn’t have a message. The idea of a Resurgent India which the BJP successfully sold in the 1990s was lost in transmission this century.

This disconnect owes quite substantially to the party’s low decency quotient. The fact is that there is something in the overall ethos of the BJP which argues against a new common sense that has developed in India. The BJP has not fought any election on the basis of assertive Hindu nationalism since 1996. Its best victories were won on the strength of bread-and-butter issues of stability, development and anti-incumbency. Gujarat 2002 was the only exception. Despite this, the party has come to be associated with menacing communalism of the Ram Sena and Kandhamal varieties and tasteless hate speeches. Against this, Rahul’s innocent earnestness and desire to “do good to people” has been preferred. The BJP has been seen to be caricatured politicians cast in the 1990s mould; Rahul and Manmohan are viewed as non-politicians and, therefore, more decent.

But the Congress isn’t the only beneficiary of being more responsive to the new common sense. In Orissa, Naveen Patnaik has redefined the calculus of electoral politics on the strength of his personality. After a decade in power, Patnaik’s command over the vernacular remains halting and his Government's achievements are modest compared to, say, Gujarat. But Patnaik exudes sincerity, epitomises personal integrity and, despite his ruthless streak, doesn’t correspond to people’s mental image of the ugly politician. He personifies the blend of sincerity, uprightness and humility that voters have found irresistible.

These are also the qualities the people upheld in 1984 and have reaffirmed once again in 2009. With Rajiv, the euphoria proved woefully short-lived and triggered the Mandir-Mandal backlash. If the Manmohan-Rahul experiment falters, the reactions could well be equally spirited.

India’s no to change - by Chandan Mitra

In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India.

Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to.

Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes. My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found here.

Some of the articles analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.


India’s no to change - by Chandan Mitra
http://dailypioneer.com/178115/India’s-no-to-change.html

On May 16, India voted out probably the best Government it never had. This is not mere wordplay. I believe the BJP-led NDA deserved another stint in office to demonstrate an alternative approach to governance, taking forward the incomplete tasks left behind by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and giving India a new direction both at home and abroad.

Lal Krishna Advani, with 60 years’ standing in public life and eight years of administrative experience (including two years as I&B Minister in the Morarji Desai Ministry) richly deserved to be India’s Prime Minister because he would have been his own man in office, not a proxy PM.

The BJP also had a well-balanced team, a mixture of experience and enthusiasm, capable of implementing fresh ideas that were a combination of welfare measures and nation-building policies. But it was not to be. India resoundingly voted for status-quo, preferring five more years of Sonia-Manmohan rule with Rahul Gandhi waiting in the wings to take over, possibly mid-way through the tenure of the 15th Lok Sabha.

In a democracy, the last word lies with the electorate and those who do not agree with the voters’ choice also must accept the judgment in all humility even while questioning the wisdom of the verdict.

Contrary to the media projection of the outcome of the 2009 election as “path-breaking” and “historic”, the fact is that it was essentially a vote for status-quo. Arguably, this was tempered with warnings delivered to certain parties especially in the States, but the electorate delivered this cautionary note knowing the applecart wouldn’t be upset anywhere.

For example, Mayawati performed worse than expected, but BSP remains the biggest political force in UP with one seat being added to its 2004 tally and two per cent to its vote share. Nitish Kumar got an overwhelming endorsement from Bihar’s voters, but the rise in the Congress’ vote share and the fact that the anti-NDA vote percentage in the State is barely one per cent less than the NDA’s, carries its own tale.

In Orissa, Naveen Patnaik romped home with staggering numbers, but BJD’s vote share is still only 37 per cent, albeit up by approximately eight per cent. Orissa and Andhra Pradesh results are significant because these were the two major States where Assembly polls were held simultaneously.

Both returned the incumbent Chief Ministers to power and even in Sikkim Pawan Chamling came back with all 32 seats in the Assembly. In other words, neither at the Centre nor in the States where Assembly polls took place, was the incumbent regime dislodged.

So, is the wheel turning full circle? Far from anti-incumbency being the key factor, has pro-incumbency emerged as the new X-factor? Howsoever tempting it might be to jump to that conclusion, it could be highly erroneous to say this definitively. It can, however, be said that over the last few years, incumbency has ceased to be an albatross around the neck of ruling parties. That benefited the BJP in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, although not in Rajasthan, in December last year, while Sheila Dikshit reaped the harvest of pro-incumbency for the Congress in Delhi.

Earlier, Narendra Modi in Gujarat had similarly bucked anti-incumbency to win successive Assembly polls in that State.

Now let’s hear the warning bells. It was loudest in West Bengal and Kerala, more resounding in the former because of the long-held assumption of the CPM’s invincibility. In Tamil Nadu, the warning was half-hearted: ADMK did win a fair share of seats but not enough to suggest that voters are disgusted enough to wait breathlessly for the first opportunity to overthrow the DMK regime. Basically, they have told the incumbent regime to shape up, not get out, as yet. Had they been certain about ousting DMK, they would not have ensured the defeat of all nominees of the Vanniyar-dominated PMK whose representative in Delhi, Anbumani Ramadoss, had unleashed terror of Tughlaqian proportions as Health Minister. In Maharashtra, voters by and large retained their faith in the bumbling Congress-NCP coalition although the incumbent regime’s performance was abetted by its own illegitimate progeny, namely, Raj Thackeray’s MNS.

It is necessary to disaggregate the 2009 verdict in order to understand it. There was no wave in favour of the Congress, nor was it an unequivocal rejection of regional parties. It was essentially a vote against change, demonstrating that the electorate was in no mood to experiment in a big way.

Barring West Bengal, Kerala, Punjab and Uttarakhand, the incumbent regimes were not jolted anywhere; even in Assam, the Congress retained the upper hand despite projections of an AGP-BJP sweep. The Congress and a few of its allies benefited most from this pro-incumbency trend by winning more seats than expected in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Kerala, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. Given this mood, which few analysts could foresee, the BJP’s performance was below par but not disastrous. It got just about 20 seats less than 2004, although it was hoping to get around 20 more than last time. It too was a beneficiary of pro-incumbency, although it didn’t do as well as expected in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. BJP improved upon its already high tally in Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh reaffirming pro-incumbency sentiment just as in Rajasthan it was pulverised in the follow through of its defeat in the Assembly six months ago.

Regional parties have suffered but not as grievously as it is being made out. BSP in my opinion hasn’t lost its base; its inability to substantially improve its presence in the Lok Sabha doesn’t mean it’s been routed, although its aspiration to emerge as a national party stands thoroughly rejected. Mulayam Singh should be reasonably happy that he managed to retain 24 seats in the face of a resurgent Congress’s success in attracting a sizeable percentage of the Muslim vote after several decades. Nitish Kumar, Naveen Patnaik, Jayalalithaa and Karunanidhi remain successful and powerful regional satraps, capable of influencing decisions even at the national level. So, writing them off would be a huge mistake.

Arguably, voters in the Left-dominated States have firmly put CPM in its place, but that is primarily because of the party’s high-handedness, insensitivity and in-fighting in those two States. It has very little to do with the voters’ disgust with the CPM’s destabilisation of the outgoing UPA regime in Delhi.

In other words, it is not entirely correct to describe the 2009 mandate as a “national” vote as opposed to the aggregate of State outcomes, although it is true that there was an undercurrent in favour of the Congress especially in the cities, which explains the party’s phenomenal success in Delhi and Mumbai.

Pressures of instant analyses, spawned by TV channels, have resulted in pundits reaching sweeping and largely misleading conclusions. The Congress, no doubt, has won but it has only 206 seats, which is why it remains desperate to have troublesome allies on board.

The BJP has lost the election squarely, but successfully retained its rural base, slowly emerging as the party of the upwardly mobile farmer rather than the urban middle class. This is a warning to the party, considering 40 per cent of India is now urbanised. But past experience tells us never to write premature political obituaries or get mesmerised by the illusion of permanence.


Monday, May 25, 2009

BJP’s need to analyse a second defeat - by Swapan Dasgupta

In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India.

Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to.

Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes.My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found here.

Some of the articles analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.

BJP’s need to analyse a second defeat - By Swapan Dasgupta

http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/print.aspx?artid=K5d80cy3O1c=

BJP’s need to analyse a second defeat


IN most Indian elections the writing on the wall isn’t apparent till after the event. This was as true in 1971 and 1984 as it was on May 16, 2009, when the outcome revealed a clear mandate in favour of the Congress-led UPA. If the BJP didn’t expect to be mauled in two successive elections, the Congress never imagined the electorate would give it a firm thumbs up after five years of indifferent governance.

For the BJP, the defeat in 2009 is qualitatively different from its unexpected failure in 2004. The failure in 2004 was a shock but the party perceived it as a fluke defeat caused by one wrong campaign slogan and over-confidence.The post-mortem exercise that followed was perfunctory and superficial.

There were no corrective steps because there was no feeling that there was a fundamental problem — an impression bolstered by the series of victories in assembly elections. The party lived in denial, looked for signs of the UPA’s premature death and convinced itself the electorate would rectify its 2004 error at the earliest.

Unlike 2004, Election 2009 was a conclusive verdict for the UPA and against both the NDA and the Third and Fourth formations. Apart from Bihar, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Assam and Chhattisgarh, there was a national swing in favour of the UPA. Compared to 2004, the BJP lost ground to the Congress in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. Its national tally was a notch below its 1991 level. The incremental gains the BJP made under Atal Behari Vajpayee until 1999 were decisively lost.In social terms, the message for the BJP was quite devastating.

First, there was definite evidence that the BJP’s hold over upper caste Hindus had been significantly eroded by Congress’ advance in Hindi heartland. The Congress, in fact, appears to be regaining its old social coalition of upper castes, Dalits and Muslims.Secondly, the loss of urban seats was marked. In 2004, the BJP lost in the metros (except Bangalore). This time, the party was rejected, not only have the metros (Bangalore apart) — in Delhi the Congress polled over 50 per cent of the votes — but also lost Jaipur, Bareilly and Kanpur. It has clung on to Indore and Bhopal with wafer-thin majorities.The middle classes were once the mainstay of the BJP. Indeed, it used to be taunted earlier as a middle class, urban party. Now the BJP has seen its middle class fall steeply — a situation it encountered only in 1984.

The BJP has seen a complete decimation of its standing in the youth. This is not merely on account of L K Advani’s octogenarian status. For the past 10 years, the BJP has not conducted itself in a way that suggests it is accommodating towards the postmarket economy generation and responsive to its impulses. On the other hand, despite the nominal presence of the septuagenarian Manmohan Singh at the helm, the Congress went out of its way to demonstrate its partiality for fresh, young faces. In hindsight, it would seem that Rahul’s series of meetings in colleges, particularly outside the metros, and the media fascination paid handsome dividends. The Congress ended up as more appealing to the youth and the BJP, by contrast, seemed completely hidebound and unresponsive.

Unfortunately for the BJP, this impression is likely to be strengthened by the parliamentary board decision to reanoint Advani as the Leader of Opposition.To the average Indian, the imperatives of taking a ‘considered decision’ are likely to be misread as unresponsiveness to popular sentiment.If it is to survive as an alternative to the Congress, the BJP cannot afford to brush the implications of a second defeat under the carpet. The familiar explanations centred on injudicious candidate selection, local anti-incumbency and tactical blunders during the campaign are no doubt relevant but they don’t address the basic problem of a larger loss of momentum.

The BJP isn’t exciting today’s voters in the same way it did in the ’90s.A predictable response to setbacks is to fall back on certitudes. Already there are whispers that the BJP erred in deviating from the path of assertive Hindutva — the factor said to be responsible for the muted involvement of the larger Sangh Parivar in the election campaign. This does not address the concerns of the average voter. It skirts a larger question: Is ‘modern’ India tired of identity politics? The answer seems self-evident.

Apart from the 2002 Gujarat Assembly election that was fought in exceptional circumstances, all elections in India have been won or lost on the strength of issues such as development, anti-incumbency and even personalities. This includes Narendra Modi’s win in Gujarat 2007, Lalu Prasad’s defeat in Bihar and Mayawati triumph in UP. Identity politics may be a factor in patches but it is on the retreat nationally.Since 1998, the BJP has fought all national elections on conventional political lines, without raising the emotional temperature. Unfortunately, it is burdened by the countervailing pulls and pressures of a small, unreconstructed minority that exaggerates its own importance and influence.

Despite the Congress’ advance, there is vast political space available for those who are inclined towards a Rightof- Centre approach grounded in alternative policy formulations. Of course, Hindu nationalism cannot be discounted altogether. But the question is the strategic weight given to identity vis-àvis governance issues.

The BJP has made an encouraging start with a manifesto that promotes deregulation, low taxation and a zero tolerance approach to terrorism. These are planks that take time to register with the electorate. In the past five years, the BJP was disdainful of parliamentary intervention and casual about projecting alternative policies. Its bizarre emphasis on ‘nationwide agitations’ that never took off and peripheral issues has cast it in an ugly light.

With the government likely to last a full term, the BJP has time to reflect and take remedial steps. It will need new faces to promote it. The choice should reflect the future priorities and direction. Advani was one thing till 1996, another in government and a third after the Jinnah controversy. His inconsistencies epitomised the waywardness of the BJP.

The Bharatiya Janata Party will always be politically significant; the coming days will determine whether or not it remains relevant.

(The writer is a political columnist and a political commentator)

Saturday, May 23, 2009

Three myths and an election - by Kanchan Gupta


In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India. Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to. Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes.

My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found 
here.

Some of the articles analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.


Three myths and an election - by Kanchan Gupta

This year’s general election will be remembered for three myths that determined its amazing outcome, catapulting the Congress to an awesome 206 seats and reducing the BJP’s tally to a paltry 116. The first is about the BJP ‘failing’ to break free of its ‘Hindutva agenda’ and coming up with proposals that would appeal to the masses and be in tune with the aspirations of India’s young. This is entirely incorrect. None of the BJP leaders who campaigned across the length and breadth of the country talked about those issues which are identified with what is crudely referred to as the party’s ‘Hindutva agenda’. I don’t recall any leader promising to abrogate Article 370, introduce a Uniform Civil Code and build a ‘grand temple’ dedicated to Sri Ram in Ayodhya. So how did this perception gain ground? The answer to this question lies in the manner in which the media, especially 24x7 news channels, portrayed the thrust of the BJP’s election campaign, wilfully misleading readers and viewers by perpetuating falsehoods in the most brazen manner, beginning with the party’s election manifesto.

Till the day of its release, only the top leaders of the BJP (you can count them on your fingertips) were privy to the contents of the manifesto. To prevent motivated leaks, the manifesto was printed the night before it was released. Yet, for nearly a fortnight before that, newspapers and news channels ran jaundiced stories about how the manifesto would focus on the BJP’s ‘core Hindutva issues’, how the Ram temple would figure prominently in it, how it was meant to revive the ‘Hindu card’, and how all this had caused a rift in the party! I happened to run into one of the peddlers of this fiction a couple of days before the manifesto was released. How do you know all this, I asked him. “Someone who is involved with drafting the manifesto has told me,” he replied haughtily. Really? The poor, pathetic sod and his feckless editor obviously had no clue about who was drafting the manifesto, what were its contents, and yet they manufactured and published stories which they knew were patent lies. I should know because I drafted the manifesto.

And when the manifesto was released, journalists didn’t even bother to read the 48-page document. Instead, they picked up three lines on page 47, which said, “The BJP will explore all possibilities, including negotiations and judicial proceedings, to facilitate the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya,” to put out stories on how the party had returned its “old hardline Hindutva”. During prime time news that evening, anchors aggressively confronted BJP spokespersons with taunting questions like, “So, the BJP, bereft of any issue, has fallen back on Ayodhya? It’s communal politics once again?” They grinned as the party’s representatives, ill-prepared and inarticulate, mumbled inanities. A news service that prides itself on being ‘different’ ran a story that was all about the BJP’s previous manifestoes. Others followed suit. And that was it. 

The manifesto talked about the economy, foreign policy, strategic affairs, climate change, education, agriculture, science and technology, gender equality, minority welfare. But all that was overlooked because for media those three lines on Page 47 were of overwhelming importance. Tragically, since media chose to ignore the substantive portions of the manifesto, which would have found a resonance with ‘young India’ had they been publicised, those leading the party’s election campaign also abandoned their own governance agenda. Instead, they talked about frivolous issues far removed from popular concerns — for example, setting up cyber cafés in impoverished villages.

And thus was the perception created that the BJP cares only about building a temple in Ayodhya and nothing else. The power of perception over reality was demonstrated when during a television debate actress Nandita Das, asked by a feisty member of the audience what exactly had Mr Varun Gandhi said in Pilibhit to merit her censure, stuttered and stammered, bit her lips, looked at her nails, tossed her head defiantly and said, “You know all those awful things he has said...” or words to that effect. Where did she read or hear about those ‘awful things’? “It’s all over the place... on TV, in newspapers. Look, we all know what he has said.” End of debate. Clearly she didn’t know what Mr Varun Gandhi had said, nor did those in media who painted him as a monster and thus sought to hobble the BJP. 

The second myth that did the BJP in is the so-called ‘consciousness’ of India’s middle class whose concern about real life issues like terrorism, inflation, job loss, credit crunch and corruption, vocally articulated by those who claim to represent ‘civil society’, has turned out to be totally bogus. Nothing else explains why the middle class should have voted for the Congress and thus endorsed its poor record of governance over the past five years. We can only surmise from the voting preference of the middle class that people who are educated, well-informed, and alert to what’s happening around them, are least bothered about corruption in high places, the relentless loot of public money, the sagging physical infrastructure, the dire straits into which the previous Government has led the national economy, the repeated terrorist attacks and India’s diminishing stature. Indeed, middle class ‘morality’ and ‘consciousness’ have turned out to be figments of our collective imagination; the next time you hear somebody waxing eloquent on how Transparency International has rated India as one of the most corrupt nations in the world, or how our country has become the favourite destination of terrorists, kick that person in the face. There is no percentage in being polite.

The third myth is about ‘good governance’ fetching votes and electoral victory. Had this been true, the BJP’s tally in Gujarat would have been much higher than 15 and Mr Naveen Patnaik’s BJD would not have swept the polls in Orissa. It would be gross exaggeration to suggest that the BJD Government has delivered on its promises or turned Orissa into a wonderland of rapid development and galloping progress. India’s single largest FDI, which was to have come by way of Posco’s steel plant, remains on paper. There has been no perceptible decline in poverty in Orissa. Anybody in Bhubaneswar will tell you about rampant corruption in the bureaucracy and how BJD Ministers had their snouts in the trough. Yes, Mr Patnaik’s image remains untarnished, but so does Mr BC Khanduri’s, yet the BJP lost all five seats in Uttarakhand. If quality of governance was really a criterion in deciding the people’s choice, the BSP’s vote share would not have increased in Uttar Pradesh, taking it way ahead of others. That this did not translate into seats is because of the quirks of the first-past-the-post system. 

Yes, the Congress has won a stupendous victory. But for all the wrong reasons. 



Friday, May 22, 2009

Night without end - by Shishir Gupta


In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India. Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to. Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes.

My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found
here.

Some of the articles analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.

Night without end - by Shishir Gupta

It was the enemy within that routed the BJP in LS 2009.

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/night-without-end/462531/0

Congress President Sonia Gandhi, her son and party general secretary Rahul Gandhi deservedly get all the credit for soundly defeating the BJP and the umbrella NDA in LS 2009. BJP’s Prime Ministerial candidate L.K. Advani’s ambitions all fell flat as the Congress made huge dents into the BJP territory while turning out exceptional electoral performance in its core states of Andhra, Delhi and Haryana. A close look at the election results show that many within the BJP and particularly the Sangh Parivar also deserve kudos for letting the party down by promoting infighting, factionalism or simply refusing to take action against errant leaders.

However, the biggest pumpkin is reserved for the Sangh Parivar which did its best to undermine L.K. Advani by giving a long rope to the mischievous activities of party president Rajnath Singh. Not only the RSS took its sweet time in agreeing to Advani’s candidature as Prime Minister for LS 2009, its joint general secretary Suresh Soni virtually ran and is still running the party through his protégé Rajnath Singh. Of course, Advani is equally to be blamed for the debacle as the man refused to exercise his influence and stature in controlling the infighting within.

Even at the peak of Rajnath versus Arun Jaitely covert war over Sudhanshu Mittal at the height of election campaign, Advani just did not take charge of the party and stem the rot. Knowing perfectly well that Advani was not the same leader in the post-Jinnah remark phase, the RSS through Rajnath Singh and his political advisor cum astrologer Sudhanshu Trivedi played havoc with the party. Otherwise, how can one explain SMSs send to all media reporters about the theft of large sum of party money from the party headquarters at Ashoka Road by one of the key aides of the party president on December 30, 2008. Or how RSS man in BJP Ram Lal overruled attempts by BJP leaders to muzzle Varun Gandhi after his hate speech and not use him in other parts of UP.

A detailed analysis of the election results show that BJP lost in only those states that were hit by infighting with no one to take control of the party discipline. Consider this:

• BJP received a drubbing in Rajasthan as State president O.P. Mathur continued to cross swords with Vasudhara Raje Scindia despite losing the Assembly elections. To add to this, old warhorses Bhairon Singh Shekhawat and Jaswant Singh took their grievance against Vasu to ridiculous levels. So Vasu hardly campaigned for BJP during LS 2009 and the entire party was split into three factions.

• The situation was slightly better in Madhya Pradesh but one of Shivraj Singh Chauhan’s own ministers was actively campaigning against the party in Indore and Mahakaushal area. The result for the BJP would have been far worse had it not been for good governance on part of Chouhan but the Congress still tripled its seats from 2004.

• The BJP knew that UP was the key to its electoral performance in LS 2009. But the fact is that two of its most prominent leaders drove a faustian bargain with BSP and SP to get elected in eastern and western UP. Not only did Rajnath checkmate state in-charge Arun Jaitely during ticket distribution, he used his clout to ensure that some of the party supporters remained aloof during the entire campaign.

• The BJP lost Uttarakhand state due to Chief Minister B.C.Khanduri inability to stand up to RSS, which made demands through the party prabhari, and leaving state governance in the hands of select few bureaucrats. And to top its all, Khanduri's running feud with RSS backed B.S. Koshiyari. The fact is that VHP leader Ashok Singhal gave an earful in chaste Hindi to Advani and Rajnath and ensured that the Haridwar seat was not given to popular local MLA Madan Kaushik. The result was a 5-0 drubbing at the hands of Congress.

• Delhi was a lost due to poor party vision or the inability of the party leadership to forcibly give VRS to its outdated leaders like Vijay Kumar Malhotra and O.P. Kohli. Rather than promote a young face in the Capital, Advani stood by Vijay Kumar Malhotra and his 1967 brand of politics in the Delhi Assembly elections. Even after the defeat at the hands of Sheila Dixit, the party still stuck to its past in LS 2009. A self important and Rajnath backed Vijay Goel was allowed to change seats from Chandini Chowk to New Delhi as a result Aarti Mehra was left in the lurch. Shatrughan Sinha and Kiriti Azad chose safe seats in Bihar and stood up against party wishes that they contest from East Delhi. The result was that the electoral defeat margins were much more than the 1984 drubbing.

• Haryana was a lost case from the beginning as BJP chose INLD as its ally rather than build upon a non-Jat platform by tying with Bhajan Lal. Even though Sushma Swaraj was rushed to Haryana to salvage the party before the fourth phase, the damage had already been done.
So has the BJP learnt a lesson after the 2009 defeat. The answer is no and the most recent example is Advani re-election as the Leader of Opposition (LoP) even the face of adverse public sentiment for the veteran leader. The fact is that the party had no options but to continue with Advani as both Rajnath and Murli Manohar Joshi were gunning for the job. In fact, before it all settled in favour of Advani, the Suresh Soni backed plan was to appoint Rajnath as LoP and Sushma Swaraj as the party president. It is another matter that Rajnath Singh would have a tough time countering die-hard Parliamentarian like Pranab Mukherjee in matters of economy or foreign policy in Lok Sabha.


While the BJP gears for the next round of Assembly elections in Maharashtra later this year, there should be a clear chain of command in the party leadership with no cross-currents all over. The last thing that Advani does before he hangs up his boots is to ensure a smooth succession in the party with all the leaders answerable to the next president and not Nagpur. The BJP has no other options.

Sunday, May 17, 2009

They won all the battles, we had the best songs (*) - by Swapan Dasgupta


[* A line from a Communist song from the Spanish Civil War]

In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India. Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to. Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes.

My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found here.

Some of the articles from journalists I respect analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.


Apologies for not writing yesterday. I was busy pontificating on TV and finishing my columns which have appeared in today's Times of India and Pioneer. Then I was out late at night commiserating with some friends in the BJP. My only bit of good news was the spectacular third-term victory of Naveen Patnaik in Orissa. I telephoned him and congratulated him for rewriting the rules of electoral politics.

Anyway, to come back to Election 2009, let me present some blunt home truths:

  • This was a positive vote for the Congress, including Sonia and Rahul.
  • The contribution of Manmohan Singh to the victory was significant. In hindsight, he was the unquestioned winner of the "weak" versus "strong" debate.
  • It was Manmohan's perceived decency that mattered to the electorate.
  • The under-30 youth vote went overwhelmingly in favour of the Congress. The Congress reinvented itself as a party where youth matters; the BJP was seen as hidebound.
  • The media helped project Congress as wholesome; the BJP was seen as ugly. Varun Gandhi may have won Pilibhit but he lost the BJP lakhs of votes nationally.
  • The middle class vote deserted the BJP and gave Congress the extra cutting edge--just see the margins of victory in Delhi.
  • The loan waiver and NREGA helped blunt possible anti-incumbency.
  • People voted by and large on national lines. This was not an aggregate of state elections. There was a national swing in favour of the Congress.
  • In UP, we are seeing the restoration of the Congress coalition which was broken in 1991. Both BJP and BSP are likely to be casualties.

What are the specific lessons for the BJP?

  • The party must recognise that this was a political failure and not merely a defeat caused by management shortcomings.
  • The so-called "Hindu" appeal may work in specific areas (Pilibhit, Mangalore, Azamgarh, Kandhamal, et al) but it is perceived as divisive elsewhere.
  • The ugly face of Hindu extremism puts off the middle ground.
  • There is no such thing as a Hindu consciousness that exists today. The nationalist middle ground has shifted to the Congress.
  • The BJP leadership is seen as completely unresponsive to youth aspirations and modernity.
  • There is a tendency of the BJP to preach to the committed and not reach outwards.
  • In caste terms, we are witnessing a definite drift of the upper castes to the Congress.
  • The OBCs are now the bedrock of the BJP but this has not been formally acknowledged.
  • The RSS-isation of the BJP organisation post-2005 has created serious distortions.
  • The integrity quotient of the BJP is now at par with that of the Congress. This is a problem that the moral guardians of the party have wilfully turned a blind eye to.

What should the BJP do immediately?

  • Recognise the magnitude of defeat and not live in denial (as happened in 2004).
  • There has to be some visible demonstration of the fact that the party has responded to the message. Advani was right to step down and the Parliamentary Board was wrong to reject it. There is still a very important role for Advani but his position is that of a mentor.
  • There has to be a revamp of most state parties. Young, dynamic MLAs and MPs must be given organisational responsibilities.
  • The RSS-non-RSS divide in the party must be bridged. Those who never attended shakhas can't be treated as second-class members.
  • The BJP must focus on the policy debates in the coming two years. Interventions in Parliament must be given due importance. The Leaders of Opposition in both Houses must be chosen accordingly.
  • The party needs to project a modern, cosmopolitan face as national president to woo back the middle classes. What is needed is a picture of wholesome sobriety. The sooner this is done the better.
  • A culture of frankness and debate has to return to the party. The miscalculations resulting from telling the leadership what it wanted to hear were colossal.
  • Modi has to add the OBC tag to his appeal. His pronouncements must become more measured. He has to work on his national acceptability.
  • Stringent norms of fund collection should be set. The private war chests have caused havoc to the functioning of the party.

Of course, there are many more issues that have to be thrashed out. But these are just some initial reactions to a silent wave for the Congress that few of us predicted.

Already I have seen some diagnosis of the debacle on the web. I can only gather that the temptation to fall back on old certitudes has proved irresistible to a few. Which is why I cited the lines from the Spanish Civil War song in the heading.