In the weeks to come, there will be several post mortem of the results of Lok Sabha election held in April - May '09 in India.
Such analysis, despite being "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" or "20/20 Vision in Hindsight", is necessary. In fact, it is to be seen as a perfect learning opportunity in marketing and branding as well as being able to sell one's vision for the nation in a language and manner that the common man can relate to and, more importantly, buy in to.
Also, it is in failures that a person or a party or a society learns more than in successes.My analysis of why BJP lost & how it can move forward can be found here.
Some of the articles analysing election results are posted in these follow-up postings (in blue below) as I come across them. Feel free to submit additional ones.
BJP’s need to analyse a second defeat - By Swapan Dasgupta
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/print.aspx?artid=K5d80cy3O1c=
BJP’s need to analyse a second defeat
IN most Indian elections the writing on the wall isn’t apparent till after the event. This was as true in 1971 and 1984 as it was on May 16, 2009, when the outcome revealed a clear mandate in favour of the Congress-led UPA. If the BJP didn’t expect to be mauled in two successive elections, the Congress never imagined the electorate would give it a firm thumbs up after five years of indifferent governance.
For the BJP, the defeat in 2009 is qualitatively different from its unexpected failure in 2004. The failure in 2004 was a shock but the party perceived it as a fluke defeat caused by one wrong campaign slogan and over-confidence.The post-mortem exercise that followed was perfunctory and superficial.
There were no corrective steps because there was no feeling that there was a fundamental problem — an impression bolstered by the series of victories in assembly elections. The party lived in denial, looked for signs of the UPA’s premature death and convinced itself the electorate would rectify its 2004 error at the earliest.
Unlike 2004, Election 2009 was a conclusive verdict for the UPA and against both the NDA and the Third and Fourth formations. Apart from Bihar, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Assam and Chhattisgarh, there was a national swing in favour of the UPA. Compared to 2004, the BJP lost ground to the Congress in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. Its national tally was a notch below its 1991 level. The incremental gains the BJP made under Atal Behari Vajpayee until 1999 were decisively lost.In social terms, the message for the BJP was quite devastating.
First, there was definite evidence that the BJP’s hold over upper caste Hindus had been significantly eroded by Congress’ advance in Hindi heartland. The Congress, in fact, appears to be regaining its old social coalition of upper castes, Dalits and Muslims.Secondly, the loss of urban seats was marked. In 2004, the BJP lost in the metros (except Bangalore). This time, the party was rejected, not only have the metros (Bangalore apart) — in Delhi the Congress polled over 50 per cent of the votes — but also lost Jaipur, Bareilly and Kanpur. It has clung on to Indore and Bhopal with wafer-thin majorities.The middle classes were once the mainstay of the BJP. Indeed, it used to be taunted earlier as a middle class, urban party. Now the BJP has seen its middle class fall steeply — a situation it encountered only in 1984.
The BJP has seen a complete decimation of its standing in the youth. This is not merely on account of L K Advani’s octogenarian status. For the past 10 years, the BJP has not conducted itself in a way that suggests it is accommodating towards the postmarket economy generation and responsive to its impulses. On the other hand, despite the nominal presence of the septuagenarian Manmohan Singh at the helm, the Congress went out of its way to demonstrate its partiality for fresh, young faces. In hindsight, it would seem that Rahul’s series of meetings in colleges, particularly outside the metros, and the media fascination paid handsome dividends. The Congress ended up as more appealing to the youth and the BJP, by contrast, seemed completely hidebound and unresponsive.
Unfortunately for the BJP, this impression is likely to be strengthened by the parliamentary board decision to reanoint Advani as the Leader of Opposition.To the average Indian, the imperatives of taking a ‘considered decision’ are likely to be misread as unresponsiveness to popular sentiment.If it is to survive as an alternative to the Congress, the BJP cannot afford to brush the implications of a second defeat under the carpet. The familiar explanations centred on injudicious candidate selection, local anti-incumbency and tactical blunders during the campaign are no doubt relevant but they don’t address the basic problem of a larger loss of momentum.
The BJP isn’t exciting today’s voters in the same way it did in the ’90s.A predictable response to setbacks is to fall back on certitudes. Already there are whispers that the BJP erred in deviating from the path of assertive Hindutva — the factor said to be responsible for the muted involvement of the larger Sangh Parivar in the election campaign. This does not address the concerns of the average voter. It skirts a larger question: Is ‘modern’ India tired of identity politics? The answer seems self-evident.
Apart from the 2002 Gujarat Assembly election that was fought in exceptional circumstances, all elections in India have been won or lost on the strength of issues such as development, anti-incumbency and even personalities. This includes Narendra Modi’s win in Gujarat 2007, Lalu Prasad’s defeat in Bihar and Mayawati triumph in UP. Identity politics may be a factor in patches but it is on the retreat nationally.Since 1998, the BJP has fought all national elections on conventional political lines, without raising the emotional temperature. Unfortunately, it is burdened by the countervailing pulls and pressures of a small, unreconstructed minority that exaggerates its own importance and influence.
Despite the Congress’ advance, there is vast political space available for those who are inclined towards a Rightof- Centre approach grounded in alternative policy formulations. Of course, Hindu nationalism cannot be discounted altogether. But the question is the strategic weight given to identity vis-àvis governance issues.
The BJP has made an encouraging start with a manifesto that promotes deregulation, low taxation and a zero tolerance approach to terrorism. These are planks that take time to register with the electorate. In the past five years, the BJP was disdainful of parliamentary intervention and casual about projecting alternative policies. Its bizarre emphasis on ‘nationwide agitations’ that never took off and peripheral issues has cast it in an ugly light.
With the government likely to last a full term, the BJP has time to reflect and take remedial steps. It will need new faces to promote it. The choice should reflect the future priorities and direction. Advani was one thing till 1996, another in government and a third after the Jinnah controversy. His inconsistencies epitomised the waywardness of the BJP.
The Bharatiya Janata Party will always be politically significant; the coming days will determine whether or not it remains relevant.
(The writer is a political columnist and a political commentator)
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